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Abstract
A major goal for advertising is to have an enduring emotional impact on an audience by facilitating their
creation of personally relevant understandings of an advertisement. This is achieved through a process of
cocreation in which consumers integrate advertising content with their own attitudes, beliefs, and values to
produce the meaning of an advertisement. This article proposes an approach to evaluating advertisements that
builds on the reconstructive nature of memory, the dominant view of memory today. The reconstructive view
of memory holds that the memory for the same event is different each time it is recalled and that the person
doing the recalling is unaware of these changes. We present an experimental paradigm that assesses
advertising's influence on consumers' own memory of their beliefs. We demonstrate that advertising can
unconsciously alter consumers' beliefs as reflected by a change in how consumers recall their earlier reporting
of these beliefs following an advertising exposure. That is, advertising that causes consumers to remember
differently earlier (preadvertising exposure) reported beliefs and in which the change is in the direction of the
advertisement's message is an advertisement that contains information the consumer has unconsciously
adopted as their own and therefore is likely to be personally relevant and to have an enduring impact on their
emotions.
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A major goal for advertising is to have an enduring ennotional impact on an audience by
facilitating their creation of personally relevant understandings of an advertisement.
This is achieved through a process of cocreation in which consumers integrate advertis-
ing content with their own attitudes, beliefs, and values to produce the meaning of an
advertisement. This article proposes an approach to evaluating advertisements that
builds on the reconstructive nature of memory, the dominant view of memory today. The
reconstructive view of memory holds that the memory for the same event is different
each time it is recalled and that the person doing the recalling is unaware of these
changes. We present an experimental paradigm that assesses advertising's influence
on consumers' own memory of their beliefs. We demonstrate that advertising can un-
consciously alter consumers' beliefs as reflected by a change in how consumers recall
their earlier reporting of these beliefs following an advertising exposure. That is, adver-
tising that causes consumers to remember differently earlier (preadvertising exposure)
reported beliefs and in which the change is in the direction ofthe advertisement's mes-
sage is an advertisement that contains information the consumer has unconsciously
adopted as their own and therefore is likely to be personally relevant and to have an
enduring impact on their emotions.
"ASKED ABOUT THE POWER of advertising in re-
search surveys, most agree it works, but not on
them" (Clark, 1985, p. 13). Luckily for advertisers,
this belief about the impact of advertising on
personal beliefs does not appear to represent re-
ality. Most psychologists agree that consumers
have little direct access to their own thought pro-
cesses (Gardner, 2004; Libet, 2004; Nisbett and
Wilson, 1977; Pinker, 2002; Wegner, 2002; Zalt-
man, 2003), and neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux
(1996, p. 32) warns against the use of such self-
report surveys: "We have to be very careful when
we use verbal reports based on introspective analy-
ses of one's own mind as scientific data."
Consumers and marketers generally distinguish
between two types of information used to make de-
cisions: internal and external. Internal information
is that which the consumer has gained through ex-
perience; external information is information they
may have encountered that attempts to influence
their beliefs. When making their decisions, consum-
ers prefer to believe they are relying on their own
internally generated information because "people
rarely derogate themselves as sources of informa-
tion" (Smith and Swinyard, 1983, p. 257).
Traditionally, advertising has been viewed as an
external source whose goals encompass inform-
ing, persuading, or reminding consumers about
the advertised offering. The dependent measures
researchers have used to assess advertising's im-
pact have followed these three general goals, such
as measuring advertising awareness, attitude
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toward the advertisement, or brand atti-
tude. However, regardless of an advertise-
ment's intent, ultimately the advertiser
hopes to influence consumers as a result
of the exposure. Ideally, the advertising
content moves from being considered an
external source and has become inte-
grated into the consumers' own internal
knowledge system. This is the primary
way in which advertising can have an
enduring emotional impact on consumers.
Many researchers have sought ways to
measure an advertisement's integration
into consumers' internal belief systems.
For example, consumers may be asked to
rate their involvement in the advertise-
ment, their emotional reaction to the ad-
vertisement, or the personal relevance of
the advertisement. Such measures rely on
questions about the advertising itself but
often fail to reveal the true impact of the
advertisement on consumer cognition.
These measures may be biased by other
information such as brand "liking," which
may result in a "halo effect" that distorts
how a person responds to the copy test
questions. More broadly, such measures
depend on the consumer's ability to self-
report; and as mentioned in the initial
paragraph, consumers may not be able to
do that accurately. This may be in part
due to cultural factors, where consumers
tend to discount the influence of advertis-
ing (Smith and Swinyard, 1983), and in
part due to cognitive factors, in that they
might not have the ability to accurately
access that information (Libet, 2004; Weg-
ner, 2002; Zaltman, 2003).
We suggest that the ultimate persuasion
occurs when advertising becomes internal-
ized into—blends with—the consumers'
belief structure that in turn fosters endur-
ing emotional impact (Fauconnier and
Turner, 2002; Kovecses, 2000). For instance,
after seeing an advertisement, we believe
that consumers may unconsciously adopt
the claims made in the advertisement as
We suggest that the ultimate persuasion occurs when
advertising becomes internaiized into^biends with—the
consumers' belief structure that in turn fosters enduring
emotional impact.
their own. This intemalization or uncon-
scious adoption of the information is made
possible through a reconstructive memory
process. By asking consumers to describe
their beliefs in advance of an advertising
exposure and then asking them to recall
their prior-stated attitudes or beliefs fol-
lowing an advertising exposure, one can
assess the direction and degree of the ad-
vertisement's influence by assessing the
changes that may have occurred. The ab-
sence of change in reported attitudes would
indicate no intemalization or ownership
of the message and suggests that the ad-
vertisement had no effect. However, if con-
sumers "remember" their earlier thoughts
and feelings as being more/less positive
following an advertising exposure, the
change can be attributed to the impact of
the advertisement. In this case, consumers
have unconsciously "forgotten" their prior
attitudes/beliefs and adopted new ones
stimulated by the advertising (if indeed the
advertising was persuasive). The new mem-
ory or "story" is the product of previous
beliefs interacting with those contained in
the advertisement. This may also involve
instant "source forgetting" where con-
sumers mistakenly attribute the learned
advertising information to having been
their own personal consistent beliefs/
attitudes all along. Consumers consider
themselves as the storyteller, not the exter-
nal communication.
The ownership of these new beliefs or
attitudes is important because such over-
all evaluations are more resistant to change
over time (Feldman and Lynch, 1988). Be-
cause advertising is often discounted by
consumers (Clark, 1985), advertisements
that work by integrating themselves into
the consumers' own belief structures may
be more influential in the long run. This
is important from a research standpoint
because this intemalization happens be-
low consumers' conscious awareness and
is unlikely to surface through traditional
verbal self-report measures.
This article begins with a brief review
contrasting the reconstructive view of
memory with the more widely used re-
productive view of memory. Evidence is
introduced in support of a reconstructive
view of memory and how this theory can
provide insight into the intemalization ad-
vertising information. Our study tests an
animatic-stage advertisement for a new
drug against a well-known competitor. In
addition, we look at whether or not
advertising-rating or advertising involve-
ment scales are related to the degree of
memory change and then examine adver-
tising's influence on memory using more
implicit measures of effect. The results
indicate a memory integration paradigm
might be especially beneficial in uncover-
ing advertising effects that consumers can-
not readily acknowledge.
BACKGROUND
Reproduction versus reconstruction
Recent thinking in advertising (Hall, 2002)
and marketing (Braun, 1999; Zaltman,
2003) has addressed the dynamics of the
5 8 JOUROflL OF OOOEflTISlOG OESEROCH M a r c h 2 0 0 6
MEMORY CHANGE
Because advertising is often discounted by consumers,
advertisements that work by integrating themseives into
the consumers' own belief structures may be more infiu-
entiai in the iong run.
human memory system and, in particu-
lar, the reconstructive view of recall. This
view has long been recognized by psy-
chologists, with Sir Frederick Bartlett (1932)
being one of the first 20th century re-
searchers to assign a reconstructive view
to memory. Bartlett viewed memory as a
tool by which we give meaning to our
world. He believed that in order to make
a sensible picture of the world, it may be
only natural that the memory system
mixes facts and our attitudes in such a
way that they become indistinguishable.
The reconstructive view finds that every
act of remembering involves a reconstruc-
tion of information, and this process at
times leads to inaccuracies (Belli, Lind-
say, Gales, and McCarthy, 1994). "Thus,
each memory event is dynamic and
context-sensitive—it yields a repetition of
a mental or physical event that is similar
but not identical to previous acts. It is
recategorical: it does not represent an orig-
inal experience exactly" (Edelman, 2004,
p. 52; see also Schacter, 2001).
In contrast, the traditional reproductive
theories of memory imply that stored men-
tal representations of past experiences are
elicited intact during recall (Reber, 1985).
This view is implicit in how advertisers
model the effects of advertising, believing
that a one-to-one correspondence exists
between what was seen and what can be
later retrieved. This reasoning underlies
the use of recall and recognition measures
of advertising exposure. The general be-
lief is that memory for a past experience.
such as viewing an advertisement, is per-
manent (Bettman, 1979), and under the
right conditions experiences can be turned
on and reviewed much like a videotape.
In a recent Journal of Advertising Research
article, Ehrenberg and colleagues advo-
cated such a view: "Once a message or
image is placed into long-term memory, it
seems virtually never to be forgotten (e.g..
Hunter, 1964; Franzen and Bouwman,
2001). Formal recognition tests and gen-
eral experience have long confirmed this
(e.g., recognizing a picture seen once
twenty years ago, or the first chord of
Beethoven's Seventh, for those who know
the Seventh). The capacity of memory is
without question vast—each of us rou-
tinely remembers so much" (Ehrenberg,
Bamard, Kennedy, and Bloom, 2002, p. 10).
This traditional view of a veridical cor-
respondence between our experiences and
bits of information in memory is intu-
itively appealing. Activating a memory
would just mean "turning on" one of
these objectively accurate bits, much like
clicking the mouse on a computer and
retrieving a stored document. However,
consider the case of Nixon legal counsel
John Dean's Watergate testimony below
that differentiates one's belief in a repro-
ductive memory system from what actu-
ally occurs through our reconstructive
memory system.
To prepare for his testimony. Dean re-
quested access to external information
sources, such as newspaper reports for
the dates in question. He did not refer to
his own notes. Thus, he recreated the mem-
ories of his conversations with Nixon and
others based on those external reports.
Yet in his testimony he was quite convinc-
ing of his belief in the veridicality of these
"internally generated" memories. In fact,
some referred to him as a "human tape
recorder" (Neisser, 1981).
Dean did not know at the time he gave
his testimony that there were in fact ac-
tual taped backups of his conversations
with Nixon. Had Dean's memory fol-
lowed a reproductive view of memory,
then Dean's testimony would have corre-
sponded well with those taped backups.
However, Dean's recollections were much
more consistent with what memory recon-
structive theorists have proposed. Dean
demonstrated egocentric tendencies where
he remembered being complimented by
Nixon for "good work," when no such
flattery was given. Hindsight bias infil-
trated his recollections when he remem-
bered warning Nixon of pursuing options
that were later dismal failures (while the
taped report offered evidence that the
opposite might be true). Dean lost his
context of time, and when pieces of con-
versations had occurred. Discrete time pe-
riods, sometimes even months apart,
became blended together as a singular
representation.
Generally, we are not "tested" for accu-
racy of a prior state as was John Dean, so
we are typically unaware of how our mem-
ories have changed. Memory distortion
has been shown in a number of different
contexts—from eyewitnesses remember-
ing people or things that were not at the
scene (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995), to how
one heard about and what one had ex-
pected the outcome of the O.J. Simpson
trial to be (Schmolck, Buffalo, and Squire,
2000), to misremembering seeing the crash
of the first plane into the World Trade
Center on 9/11 on TV (Pezdek, 2003). In
an advertising setting, such changes in
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memory would indicate the internaliza-
tion of the advertising information. In the
next section, we review attitude change
research pointing toward memory recon-
struction as the mechanism underlying
persuasion.
Internalization of persuasive information
through memory reconstruction
Research in social psychology suggests
that memory reconstruction may mediate
attitude change. For instance, in an early
study, Goethals and Reckman (1973) sur-
veyed people that were biased pro or
con toward racial integration of schools
through busing and assessed their atti-
tudes at that time. Seven days later, they
were exposed to counter-attitudinal argu-
ments delivered by a convincing spokes-
person. Attitudes were checked again. In
addition, they asked participants to re-
call their pretest attitudes. As cognitive
dissonance theory would predict, the
newer attitudes moved in the direction
of the counter-attitudinal messages. How-
ever, an unexpected result occurred in
the recall test in which participants' re-
called their previous attitudes differently
and in the direction of the counter-
attitudinal messages. Goethals reported
that several participants wanted to see
their pretest attitude measures and were
"genuinely surprised to find the change."
What appears to have happened is that
the participants were unable to remem-
ber their prior attitudes because they had
become unconsciously altered by expo-
sure to the counter-attitudinal information.
Application to advertising
There is a belief among advertising research-
ers that persuasion through advertising
takes a long time, so the aforementioned
study may not be applicable to the adver-
tising testing domain. This belief is sup-
ported in a classic study by Maloney (2000,
p. 6):
"It may be true that if one is dealing
with a small enough 'bit' of stimulus-
response unit, learning occurs in a sin-
gle trial. An attitude, however, is not
the smallest irreducible element. There-
fore, when we are talking about atti-
tude change, we are talking about a
process that presumably does not oc-
cur in a single instant of time. This is
true even though the manifestation of
a change in attitude may occur as a
single event when sufficient covert 'bits'
have been learned to result in a kind
of 'flapover' in response to a question."
Indeed, in previous studies on attitude
change, there was a week or more delay
before the memory change was ob-
served. Research in cognitive psychol-
ogy, however, finds that such a delay is
not necessary for adoption of informa-
tion in memory (Belli, Lindsay, Gales, and
McCarthy, 1994). And although it is true
that attitudes may not be reducible to a
single element, the information on which
attitudes are formed is stored as neurons
in the brain, the smallest elements of cog-
nition, and those neural networks are in
continuous change (Edelman, 2004; Zalt-
man, 2003). Bartlett (1932) expressed the
belief, and now neuroscience is confirm-
ing it, that memory and attitude are an
interrelated process (Crick and Koch, 1998;
Edelman, 2004; Schacter, 1996, 2001; Squire
and Knowlton, 1999).
Braun and Zaltman (1998) were inter-
ested in whether time was indeed neces-
sary for attitude and memory change to
occur. In their study, they had consumers
view a movie clip and then rate how they
thought it would do in the actual market.
Twenty minutes later, participants were
given either a positive or negative critical
opinion of the movie, in which they were
asked to assess how well it was written.
Five minutes later, participants were asked
to recall how they had earlier rated the
movie. These participants were told that
they were taking a memory test and to do
their best to recall what they had earlier
predicted. If they had forgotten, they could
indicate that on the questionnaire. The
researchers found a memory shift in those
recalled items; the consumers that had
read the positive critical opinion believed
they had rated the movie more favorably
than they actually had, and vice versa for
the negative criticism group. None of the
participants said they "forgot" their ear-
lier rating.
Consciousness of the memory process
No two memories involving the same
event are ever exactly the same, as the
patterns of activation involved in retriev-
ing information will differ each time the
event is recalled (Edelman, 2004). These
differences may often be very small and
of no practical consequence. In other in-
stances they may also be substantial and
have great consequence as in certain cases
of false memory (Loftus and Ketchum,
1996). Whether it is as simple as recalling
one's own telephone number or as com-
plex as remembering an emotional child-
hood experience, this reconstructive process
persists and is the accepted view of mem-
ory in psychology today. The ease with
which some memories seem to "pop" into
our minds reflects our unawareness of
this complex reconfiguration (Crick and
Koch, 1998; Wegner, 2002).
External information can distort mem-
ories without consumers' awareness,
thereby giving them the false sense of
security that it is their own experiences
which drive their decision making. "New
information invades us like a Trojan horse,
precisely because we do not detect its
influence" (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995,
p. 720). Research on hindsight bias finds
that projection of new knowledge into
the past is accompanied by a denial that
such outcome information has influenced
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one's judgment (Hawkins and Hastie,
1990). This is consonant with what Goe-
thals and Reckman (1973), Ross (1989),
Braun (1999), and Zaltman (2003) all found
in their memory/attitude change experi-
ments: participants were unaware that
their memories had been altered. Neuro-
scientific evidence confirms that the brain
activity when recalling a "true" memory
is very similar to that involved when
recalling a "false" memory—both show
activation in the hippocampal region that
is associated with emotion. There is a
conviction when recalling a memory that
it "feels" real, regardless of its actual ve-
racity (Schacter, 1996; Squire and Knowl-
ton, 1999).
Pre/posttesting designs
In this study, consumers were asked at
one point in time about their beliefs on an
issue, then later exposed to an advertising
message intended to influence those be-
liefs. Subsequently they were asked to
repeat the information provided initially
(in a memory test) and, a few days later
still, were again asked to recall their prior
stated beliefs. The use of pre/posttesting
designs of attitude change is quite com-
mon to most advertising research (such as
the ARS Persuasion Measure, Blair and
Rabuck, 1998). Such designs are impor-
tant because they take into account idio-
syncratic preexisting differences among
advertising conditions that may bias how
an advertising campaign is received (Ha-
ley and Baldinger, 2000). These differ-
ences in knowledge, or of competitor
activities, may be particularly relevant
when launching a new brand into an al-
ready established product category (Burke
and Srull, 1988). However, it is important
to distinguish how advertisers have typi-
cally used the pre/postdesigns from the
design proposed in the current study.
Many advertising researchers believe
that attitude/belief changes cannot be
Neuroscientific evidence confirms that the brain activity
when recaiiing a "true" memory is very simiiar to when
recaiiing a "false" memory—both show activation in the
hippocampai region that is associated with emotion.
monitored after one viewing session, and
the pre/postdesigns are often adminis-
tered over a longer period of time in
which consumers have been potentially
exposed to the advertising campaign nu-
merous times. The problem is that in al-
lowing greater time between initial and
postattitude measures, more potentially
intervening material can also be pre-
sented that can interfere with attitudes.
Also, there is no way to know whether or
not consumers have actually been ex-
posed to the advertising campaign (and if
so, for how many exposures). Therefore,
there is a lot less control over the situa-
tion in the typical pre/postdesign com-
pared to a more controlled experimental
setting.
Perhaps more problematic is the man-
ner in which questions are asked of par-
ticipants in the attitude (or choice) studies.
Because participants are aware that the
researcher is interested in assessing their
attitude changes (or choices) based on the
advertising exposure, some may overesti-
mate the impact of advertising by indicat-
ing more favorable attitudes; others may
do the reverse and underestimate, be-
cause they do not want to believe that the
advertising had an impact on their be-
liefs. Both types of effects, due to experi-
menter demand or social desirability, create
problems in the interpretation of these
explicit attitude measures. This criticism
applies fully to those situations in which
consumers are given a TV program to
watch with various advertisements em-
bedded and then later asked about the
target advertisement.
In contrast, the memory integration par-
adigm introduced here asks participants
to recall their prior attitudes/beliefs as
accurately as possible. There is no indica-
tion that the researcher in any way wants
them to include their assessment of the
advertising. In fact, the contrary is true:
they are explicitly directed to be as accu-
rate as possible because they are involved
in a memory test. These instructions limit
the self-preservation bias and demand ef-
fects. Therefore, whatever changes occur
in their recall measures can be reliably
attributed to how much they internalized
the advertising as being their own origi-
nal thought, versus how much they might
be consciously weighing the advertising
as they make their current attitude judg-
ments. The highly controlled viewing set-
ting allows us to isolate the impact of the
advertising's message on beliefs.
ADVERTISiNG STUDY
The purpose of this study was to deter-
mine whether a memory integration par-
adigm would be useful in an advertising
research setting. It is important to note
that the advertising environment is very
different from the attitude change situa-
tions studied by social psychologists cited
earlier. First, information used in the so-
cial psychology experiments could be con-
sidered more credible than advertising
and thus more likely to be accepted as
one's own belief (Schacter, 1996). However,
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because memory changes occur at a pre-
conscious level, it may be that the mem-
ory integration paradigm can also capture
the extent to which advertising informa-
tion is integrated into consumers' belief
systems. This study incorporates mem-
ory change measures and more familiar
self-report measures of advertising influ-
ence. Additionally, we incorporate an im-
plicit memory task (word completion) to
determine if the advertising exposure and
subsequent memory changes would be
related to other indirect measures of in-
fluence. It is important to determine if
observed results in a lab situation last
over time (e.g., McQuarrie, 1998), so we
also test for the persistence of memory
change subsequent to the laboratory ses-
sion. Any persistence of change would
suggest that the message had become well
integrated into consumers' knowledge
structure in an enduring way.
The advertisement-testing environment
also sets some constraints for certain brands,
particularly new brands. Prior exposure to
competitor advertising is likely to influ-
ence how that new brand/advertisement
is perceived. Additionally, the familiarity
associated with the current leader may un-
fairly bias the ratings toward that brand's
advertisement and not give the new en-
trant's advertisement a "fair shake." This
is particularly problematic when using ab-
solute measures such as recall or attitude
toward the advertisement. A relative mea-
sure that could isolate prior knowledge from
the influence of the test advertisement
would be beneficial for testing; the mem-
ory change measure is designed to parse
out such prior influence.
Another difference in the advertisement-
testing situation has to do with the adver-
tising itself, mainly the cost. The social
psychology experiments mentioned ear-
lier involved simple print or verbal infor-
mation. In advertising development, as
one moves from the simple storyboard to
the animatic advertisement to the fin-
ished product, costs accelerate. Ideally, one
would want to find a method that could
be diagnostic and fix the advertisement
before much money had been spent.
To determine whether this paradigm
might be effective for new brands with a
relatively unfinished advertising product,
we chose to test an animatic advertisement
for a new prescription medication (brand
A) against a finished advertisement being
run by an existing market leader (brand B)
and a control group where no advertise-
ment was seen. While animatics cannot be
expected to have the same impact as a fin-
ished TV advertisement, evaluative re-
search on animatics is essential input for
improving the final advertisement and
hence an appropriate form of communica-
tion to test. To the extent that the animatic
version produced results directionally con-
sistent with the finished advertisement, we
can have at least some confidence in the
use of this approach as a developmental
tool in the early stages of testing alterna-
tive advertisements.
Before running our main study, we con-
ducted a pilot test on 14 consumers who
were part of the target market for the
tested drug (each was paid $50 for his/
her time) to determine if the unfinished
nature of the commercial would detract
from their acceptance of the advertise-
ment. Each participant was asked for his/
her attitude on several measures regarding
the treatment of the participants' health
conditions a few days prior to the adver-
tisement viewing session. At the session,
they were told before viewing the ad-
vertisement that this commercial was in
unfinished "animatic" form. They were
shown the advertisement three times and
asked to give written feedback and rate it
on a number of scales. They were also
given a short distraction task (word com-
pletion, which is used as an implicit mea-
sure in the main test), and then asked to
recall their prior stated attitudes and to
indicate "don't remember" if they could
not recall what they had previously said.
All participants showed a memory change
on at least one of the attitude measures.
No one seemed to have a problem with
viewing the advertisement in a less than
finished form.
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty-three par-
ticipants (69 females, 64 males) having an
average age of 53 and coming from north
suburban Chicago participated in our
study. They were recruited by a market
research firm, and to be eligible they
needed to be between the ages of 40 and
70 and diagnosed with the health prob-
lem addressed by the test drug advertise-
ments. Participants had to be available for
a pretelephone interview 48 hours prior
to the advertisement testing session, avail-
able to watch the advertisement in a test-
ing session, and available for a follow-up
call two to three days after the session.
They were each paid $50 for their partici-
pation in the study.
Participants were assigned to appear at
one of the advertisement-testing sessions
(brand A, brand B, or control, where no
advertisement was seen). These three
groups were recruited to be split on gen-
der and usage of medication to treat their
health problem. All groups were over-
recruited: 41 showed for the brand A
group, 48 for brand B, and 44 for the
control group. For the follow-up call, one
person from the brand A group and four
people from the control group could not
be contacted.
Procedure. Participants were recruited
based on the above specifications, and at
that time the recruiter made an appoint-
ment to speak with them two days before
the testing session. For the initial attitude
measures, they were asked to state their
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agreement/disagreement with the target
belief statements on a 10-point scale, where
greater agreement was associated with
higher numbers. The first four statements
concerned their overall beliefs about need-
ing to take prescription medication for
their condition, how much they believed
that their situation could be remedied
through lifestyle changes alone, how safe
they perceived the prescription medica-
tions to be, and their level of satisfaction
with their current treatment of their con-
dition. These more general statements were
delivered in random order among the
participants.
The next six statements concerned their
attitudes/beliefs toward brands A and B.
For each brand, they gave their beliefs
about that brand's effectiveness, its ability
to solve their problems and help them to
live their lives better, and their likelihood
of purchasing that brand in the future.
Participants were given a 10-point scale
on which to rate each brand, with higher
numbers indicating more positive beliefs/
attitudes or intent. After getting the par-
ticipants' responses, the recruiter reminded
them of their time for the upcoming ses-
sion, and provided driving directions to
the market research facility.
On the day of testing, participants ar-
rived at the market research facility and
were led into a large room where chairs were
in rows in front of a large screen. Partici-
pants were given a questionnaire, told to
take a seat and to get comfortable. They
were instructed not to talk to one another,
told that we were interested in their per-
sonal beliefs, and informed that this was
not a "focus group." Those in the adver-
tisement viewing conditions were told they
would be watching a commercial and pro-
viding both detailed written and rating in-
formation on the advertisement.
The advertisements were shown three
times: for the first time, participants were
just asked to indicate the brand name; the
second time, they provided more exten-
sive written feedback; and following the
third viewing, they rated the advertise-
ment on a number of items such as their
attitudes toward the advertisement.
Following the advertisement viewing and
rating session, the participants had five min-
utes to perform a word completion task
designed to create some disassociation/
distraction between the advertisement and
later measures as well as to determine if
the advertising exposure "primed" certain
words or feelings. Those in the control group
skipped the advertisement viewing and rat-
ing, and were given the word completion
task immediately.
After five minutes, the groups pro-
ceeded to the memory measures, where
they saw the same 10 items about treating
their conditions that they had been asked
about two days earlier. They were told
this was a memory test, and also the
following: "To the best of your ability,
answer the questions below as you did
earlier. If you cannot recall exactly what
your answers were, indicate what you
probably would have said." The modera-
tor explained that sometimes hearing the
questions may help the participants re-
member, and she read aloud each of the
10 statements as participants recalled their
prior beliefs (as per Tulving's encoding
specificity hypothesis, Thomson and Tulv-
ing, 1970). Following those measures, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate their
confidence in their memories and whether
or not they felt the advertising influenced
their memories (for advertisement view-
ing conditions only).
Afterward, participants proceeded
through the questionnaire at their own pace.
If they were in one of the advertising con-
ditions, they rated the advertisement on a
standard advertising involvement scale. All
of them then proceeded to some general
questions about their behavior. The ses-
sion lasted approximately 40 minutes for
the advertising conditions and about 30
minutes for the control condition. After the
participants completed their questionnaires,
they turned them in to the moderator and
went to another room to claim their par-
ticipant's fee.
Two to three days after the session,
they were contacted again by phone. So
as not to reveal the true nature of the
contact, they were first asked how much
they enjoyed the session and what they
had done afterward. Then they were told
we were interested in their current beliefs/
attitudes toward treating their health prob-
lem and that they would be asked the
same questions as earlier. The same 10
attitude/belief questions were asked (with
the first four randomized), and they were
thanked again for their time.
Measures
Two days prior to the session participants
were asked about their attitudes/beliefs
about treating their health problems and
asked the same questions again at the
session following a standard distraction
task immediately after viewing the adver-
tisement (or no advertisement in the case
of the control group). It was expected that
if the message contents were effectively
internalized by participants they would
display memory changes in the direction
of the advertising information. That is,
there would be a new set of meanings
created by participants that would be a
blend of their earlier beliefs and those
contained in the communication. In the
following tables and charts, these mem-
ory changes are defined as the difference
between the initial and recalled attitudes,
"Memory Al." Once again, participants
were told this exercise was a memory test
and asked to provide as best they could
the same answers provided two or three
days earlier when initially contacted by
phone. No explicit reference was made to
the advertisement.
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Participants were also contacted two to
three days following the advertising ex-
posure session and again asked about their
attitudes. For this questioning, there was
no reference made to their prior results;
rather, they were asked to report their
current attitudes/beliefs. Our interest in
conducting this follow-up contact was to
determine whether an observed memory
change during the advertising exposure
session was merely a context effect that
would disappear over time, or if the in-
formation had become internalized into
their belief systems to continue to influ-
ence their attitudes. In the following tables
and figure, we look at the difference be-
tween the first and last attitude measures,
which we call "Memory A2."
We found that these two change mea-
sures were highly correlated, r — .64, sug-
gesting that there was no decay of the
advertising information on memory. In
fact, in some instances we found an even
greater influence of the advertising on
memory change over time, suggesting a
"sleeper effect" of the advertising infor-
mation. This effect is consistent with many
views of memory: over time, the source
information (advertisement) decays, but
the content of the information is retained
(Schacter, 1996). Because consumers no
longer attribute the advertising informa-
tion to its correct source, they weigh the
information as being more credible (as
coming from their internal knowledge
base). In our reporting of the results be-
low, we refer mainly to the Memory Al
results, as the Memory A2 results fol-
lowed the same pattern (if not more
strongly).
Memory change results
Memory change can be assessed in sev-
eral ways. One is to consider the number
of items exhibiting change for each indi-
vidual that was in the direction of the
advertising message. For instance, the ab-
sence of change on any measure would
indicate no influence of the advertising,
and changes on several measures would
indicate that the advertising had some
effect. We found that those in the brand A
advertising condition (the animatic for the
new brand) changed on more of the mem-
ory items (Al), X = 3.4, than those in the
brand B condition, X = 2.7, and the con-
trol condition, X = 1.7. Using the general
linear model, with condition as the factor,
we found the model to be significant at
F(2,i32) = 13.17, p = .001, but that only the
brand A condition was significantly dif-
ferent than the control.
Following the memory recall items in
the main session, participants were asked
how confident they were that they were
correctly able to recall their prior atti-
tudes (on a scale where 1 = not at all
confident and 10 = extremely confident).
One could argue that those who were the
most influenced may be overall less con-
fident and subject to change again in the
future. We found, however, no significant
difference in confidence across the three
groups, X = 7.0 for brand A, X = 6.5 for
brand B, and X = 6.9 for controls.
In addition to asking participants about
their confidence in recall, we also asked
those in the two advertising conditions how
much they felt they relied on the advertis-
ing when making their memory judgments.
Those in the brand A condition were more
likely than those in the brand B condition
to suggest that the advertisement had an
influence, 36 percent versus 19 percent, sig-
nificantly different at XIN=&S) ~ 3-4/ P — -06.
However, in both advertising conditions
more people felt they were relying solely
on their past memories than the advertis-
ing, 64 percent in brand A and 81 percent
in brand B, suggesting that for the most part
people were discounting the advertising's
impact. The uniqueness of the animatic
could account for the greater salience of that
exposure.
One might conclude that those who were
more confident in their recall reported less
reliance on the advertising, but there
was virtually no correlation (r = —.03)
between the two factors. We also looked
at the relationship between confidence
and memory: were those who were more
confident better recallers? Here, too, there
was no significant association observed,
r = —.07. Finally, we looked at the relation-
ship between those who said they relied
more on the advertising and the total num-
ber of items on which they had changed
impressions; these were also uncorrelated,
r = —.05. The lack of correlation in these
instances is important. Participants were not
consciously aware of the alteration in their
attitudes/beliefs as a consequence of the
advertisements. That is the power of mem-
ory reconstruction.
One way to assess the impact of the
advertising on the recollection process is
by looking at the variance in the distribu-
tions of the memory items themselves.
For instance, if everyone was remember-
ing their prior attitudes correctly, there
would be a very tight distribution around
the average reported score for each mea-
sure (allowing for some reporting error).
However, if the distribution around the
mean on the measures were wider, more
varied, that would suggest the advertis-
ing was altering how those prior attitudes
were recollected. A more variable distri-
bution would suggest greater consumer
confusion; a tighter distribution around
the mean would suggest more accuracy.
We found that in both advertising condi-
tions the distribution of recalls at adver-
tisement viewing was more varied, 3.7,
compared to a variance of 2.2 in the con-
trol condition. Over time this continued,
where in the measures after the session,
variances in the advertising conditions con-
tinued to be higher, at 4.1 in brand B and
4.2 in brand A, compared to 3.3 in the
control condition.
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In both advertising conditions more peopie felt tiiey were i^ g diet and exercise and their views on
taking medications for their condition
reiying soieiy on their past memories than the advertis- (Questions l and 2). The third question
addressed safety issues, and the fair bal-
ing . . . s u g g e s t i n g that for the most part peopie were "^^ ^ statement in which the advertise-
ment mentions side effects of the drug
discounting the advertising's impact. appeared to hurt brand A more in the
short term, though over time partici-
pants "forgot" those concerns. Question
4 addressed current satisfaction, and brand
While this greater variance is evidence have some negative impact on the com- A, the new brand, had more impact on
for the advertising's impact on recall, it is petition, where those who saw the brand remembered satisfaction than the market
more important to look for the direction A advertisement, for instance, recall being leader brand B's advertisement,
of that impact. Table 1 summarizes the less positive about brand B. The remaining questions pertained to
directional predictions of the advertis- As shown in Table 2, both brand A attitudes toward brand A and brand B
ing's impact on consumer recollection of and brand B impacted participants' mem- directly. Seeing the brand B advertise-
the 10 measures, and the Table 2 provides ory of their earlier stated beliefs regard- ment seemed to have little impact on
the actual results. Notice that in some
cases it is predicted that people will think
they had a more positive initial attitude
than they actually did (the t), because the TABLE 1.
advertisement was trying to convey that MeiTlOry PrSClJCtiOnS
medication is necessary for many people,
making people more accepting of the idea ly^ .^ ^V'.? Prediction
of taking a prescription drug. In other Q I ; | will be able to keep my X down by eating X diet and without Brand A: 4-
cases, the attitude is predicted to go down. taking a prescription medication. Brand B: i
For example, consider the eraphed results -Q2: I will need a X prescnption medication to help lower my X. Brand A: T
in Figure 1 where it is predicted that the .
^ Brand B: T
participants may remember being less sup-
portive of the view that "diet and exercise Q^: Prescription medications for X are safe for me to take. Brand A: T
are enough" after viewing advertisements .^'^ ?.'?.^ ,.?:..:
intended to influence that belief. Time 1 Q4: Satisfaction with your current method of treatment? Brand A: 4-
referred to in Figure 1 is the mean of the Brand B: 4-
first measure of that belief (by group), ^ 5 . ^ ow effective do you feel brand B would be for lowering your X? Brand A: i
time 2 is the mean group recall average „ d B- T
after viewing the commercial, and time 3
, , r^  M • Q6: Brand B helps keep X under control and allows me to live life Brand A: 4-
ls several days after the session.
T, .. , c - u u n^Of's enjoyably. Brand B: T
The hnal measures were specific to each •••• •
brand; it is expected that those who see Q''': How likely would you be to try brand B to lower your X? Brand A: 4-
the brand A advertisement should remem- Brand B: T
ber being more favorable about that Qg: How effective do you feel brand A would be for lowering your X? Brand A: T
brand's effectiveness, ability to add "bal- Brand B' i
ance" to one's life, and their likelihood of "Q9: Brand A helps keep X under control and allows me to live life Brand A: T
trying it in the future; and the same is
° more enjoyably. Brand B: 4-
true for the brand B measures when one
sees that commercial. Additionally, it is ^^^- ^°'^ ''*^^ 'y ^°"'<^ y°u '°^ ^ ° '^V '°^^"^ ^ to lower your X? Brand A: T
suspected that the advertisements may ?r.?.9.^..?:....
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TABLE 2
Memory Change Results
Memory
A2 Statistical Analyses
Ql: Belief about healthy lifestyle solving problem
Brand A -.68 -.68 Brand A was statistically different than the control at t(83) = 2.23, p = 03 for both Memory A l and A2;
Brand B -.79 -.79 brand B was significantly different than the control at t(90) = 2.0, p = .04 for both iVIemory A l and A2.
Control .02 .02
Q2: Belief about needing prescription medication to solve problem
Brand A .24 .85 Brand A was statistically different than the control for A l ; t{83) = 1.43, p = . 1 , and t(78) = 2.5, p = .01 for
Brand B .50 .67 Memory A2; brand B was statistically different than the control at A l , t{90) = 2.3, p = .02 and for A2,
Control - .38 -.17 t(86) = 1.43, p = . 1 .
Q3: Concern about safety of prescription medication to treat problem
Brand A -.54 .22 At for A l , brands A and B were statistically different, t{87) = 1.35, p = .09, but the effect disappeared over
Brand B -.08 .31 time. Brand B was significantly different than the control at A2, t{86) = 1.49, p = .07.
Control -.52 -.27
Q4: Satisfaction with current method of treating problem
Brand A -.34 -.32 Brand A was statistically different than the control, t(83) = 1.27, p = . 1 ; t(78) = 1.41, p - .08, for Memory
Brand B -.23 -.19 A l and A2, respectively. There was no significant difference for brand B (either time period).
Control .11 .30
Q5: Beiief in effectiveness of brand B
Brand A -.09 -.25 For Memory A2, brands A and B were statistically different at t(87) - 1.76, p = .08.
Brand B .02 .37
Control - .09 -.09
Q6: Beiief that brand B can improve their iife
Brand A -.43 -.35 No statistically significant differences.
Brand B -.25 -.04
Control - .13 -.27
Q7: Likelihood to buy brand B
Brand A -.34 -.90 For Memory A2, brands A and B were statistically different at t{54) = 1.81, p = .07.
Brand B 0 .24
Control - .43 .01
Q8: Effectiveness of brand A
Brand A .85 1.10 For Memory A l , brand A was significantly different from brand B, t(87) = 2.3, p =.02; and from the control.
Brand B .02 -.28 t(83) = 2.7, p = .007. For Memory A2, brand A was significantly different from brand B, t(86) = 3.4,
Control - .20 -.05 p = .00, and from the control, t(78) = 2.5, p = .01.
Q9: Beiief that brand A can improve their life
Brand A 1.08 1.06 For Memory A l , brand A was significantly different from brand B, t(86) = 2.4, p = .01; and from the control.
Brand B -.27 -.54 t(83) = 2.2, p = .03. For Memory A2, brand A was significantly higher the brand B, t(85) = 3.7, p = .0001,
Control - .05 -.18 and from the control, t(78) = 2.7, p = .01.
QIO: Likelihood to buy brand A
Brand A .34 .45 Movement was more positive in the brand A condition, and more negative in brand B condition for
Brand B -.63 -.79 Memory A l , significantly different at t(87) = 2.3, p = .02, and also significantly different for Memory A2,
Control .02 .15 t(86) = 2.5, p = .01.
6 6 JDURnHL or HDUERTISIOG BESEROCH March 2 0 0 6
MEMORY CHANGE
6.5-
6-
5.5-
5-
4.5-
4-
3.5-
Q
Time 1
—•
Time 2
•— Brand A
*— Brand B
• • Control
5 . 1
^ ^ 4 4
Time 3
Figure 1 Graph of Memory
Change: Question 1;
Predicted Direction: Down for
Advertising Groups
either beliefs about the brand or beliefs
about brand A. Brand A, however, had a
large impact on how consumers recalled
earlier feeling about that brand, on effec-
tiveness, "balance," and purchase intent.
In addition, brand A appeared to hurt
brand B's effectiveness and each partici-
pant's belief in that drug's ability to bring
his/her life into balance.
Indirect measures of advertising's
impact
As a distraction task between the adver-
tisement viewing and memory measures,
and as a first task for the control group,
participants were told: "Below is a list of
partially completed words. Complete them
with whatever word comes to your mind
first. We'll spend about five or so minutes
on this page." The following partially com-
pleted words were presented:
TR F MA_IO_;
AN_fCI_AT_N;_IG_fT_;CA__;
P_OA__rV_; _UA__TY;
_OMF_R_; TR ; GUA AN;
__NNEC__ON; AP_RO_C_.
The answers we were looking for were:
transformation, anticipation, dignity, care,
proactive, quality, comfort, trust, guard-
ian, connection, and approach. In other
research, these words were found to be
related to important constructs concern-
ing the product and brand the advertising
was intending to address. If the advertise-
ment had successfully "primed" those
ideas, then there would be more comple-
tion of the words in the advertising con-
ditions (particularly for brand A, which
was designed to address such ideas; this
measure is similar to Shapiro and Krish-
nan, 2001).
Brand A's advertisement was more ef-
fective than brand B's advertisement and
the control condition in activating the tar-
get words. The overall results appear in
Table 3. This greater activation may be
due to the fact that brand A was offering
new information in a very different man-
ner than the brands that were currently
advertising. These results present indepen-
dent validation of the greater influence of
brand A's commercial (which was ob-
served also in the memory change mea-
sures). Both the memory change and
implicit word completion task address the
unconscious influences of the advertising.
Otiier measures
At the commercial viewing session, par-
ticipants recorded their thoughts about
the commercial and also rated it on a
number of scales. The four key "attitude
toward the advertisement" measures had
participants rate the advertisement on four
10-point semantic differential scales, an-
chored by the terms unfavorable-favorable,
bad-good, unpleasant-pleasant, and
negative-positive. These four scales have
been used in past marketing research to
assess consumers' attitudes toward an ad-
vertisement. We found the scales to load
on one factor, with Cronbach alpha = .93;
and they were averaged to form an index
of "attitude toward the advertisement."
This index was used for the analysis. The
brand B advertisement was rated 8.0 (on
the 10-point scale where higher values =
more positive attitudes). The brand A ad-
vertisement was rated at 6.9. These were
found to be significantly different at t(87) =
3.06, p = .003.
After the memory measures, participants
were asked to rate how involved they be-
came with the advertisement. These mea-
sures are often used to assess whether or
not an advertisement has become internal-
ized. For these measures, the participants
indicated how much the advertisement
"fit" or "doesn't fit" their situation on the
following items: important to me, helpful,
valuable, meaningful for me, worth remem-
bering, and convincing. The scale was
anchored by 1 = "does not fit" and 10 =
"fits extremely well." We found these six
items loaded on one factor, with Cronbach
alpha of .96. We combined them to form an
index of "advertising involvement." Par-
ticipants rated the brand B advertisement
as being more involving than the brand A
advertisement, 7.6 versus 7.2, but this dif-
ference was not statistically significant.
Competitive factors
The attitude toward the advertisement
measure indicated that brand B's reputa-
tion influenced how that advertisement
was rated. We further assessed the com-
petitive environment for brand A by ask-
ing participants to remember if they could
recall having seen any other commercials
related to the health concern issue ad-
dressed in the study. One of the difficul-
ties brand A has in entering an already
established product category for which
lots of advertising dollars have already
been spent is that the new brand may
inadvertently activate knowledge of the
existing brands. For this analysis, we
looked at recall differences between the
new entrant brand A, the established brand
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TABLE 3
Implicit Word Completion Results
Transformation
Anticipation
Dignity
Care
Comfort
Proactive
Approach
Trust
Guardian
Connection
Quality
Overall number identified
Brand A
76%
80%
17%
17%
75%
70%
75%
12%
68%
87%
56%
7.0
Brand B
43%
79%
6%
14%
60%
60%
60%
16%
43%
79%
37%
5.5
Control
54%
65%
25%
6%
6 1 %
65%
47%
14%
54%
72%
45%
5.6
Statistical Tests
Brand A vs. brand B: X(N=88) = 9-8, p = .001; brand A vs. control, X^N=84) = 3-6,
p=.O5.
Brand A vs. control: ^(^=84) = 2.1, p = . 1 .
Brand B vs. control: ;^ f(^ =92) = 6.2, p = .01.
Brand A vs. brand B: A'(N=88) = 2.5, p = . 1 .
Brand A vs. brand B: ;^'(N=88) = 2.5, p = . 1 ; brand A vs. control: A'(N=84) = 7.5,
p = .006.
Brand A vs. brand B: ^"(^=88)= 5.8, p = .01
Brand A vs. control: "^(^ =88) = 3.2, p = .07.
Brand A vs. brand B: "^(^ =88) = 2.8, p = .09.
Brand A vs. control t(86) = 1.96, p = .05; brand A vs. brand B t(88) = 2.45,
p = .Ol.
B, and control conditions. If there is over-
all more memory for another brand's ad-
vertising in a certain condition, it would
be evidence that prior knowledge may be
influencing consumers' perceptions of the
test advertisement.
We found that in both the brand A and
brand B advertising conditions, recall for
other drug advertisements related to this
health issue was higher (73 and 67 per-
cent) than in the control condition (53
percent), but that only the brand A con-
dition was significantly different from the
control condition at X(N==85) — 3-17, p =
.01. The two advertising conditions were
not statistically different from one an-
other. This demonstrates that seeing the
new brand A commercial activates mem-
ories of commercials that would not have
been activated otherwise.
We also looked specifically at what ad-
vertisements were remembered and found
that 54 percent in the brand A group
recalled advertisements for the existing
leader brand B, 59 percent in the brand B
group recalled other advertisements for
brand B, and 30 percent in the control
group reported seeing an advertisement
for brand B in the past. Both advertising
conditions were significantly higher than
the control, X{N=92) ~ 6.5, p = .01 for the
comparison between brand B and the con-
trol, and Xov=85) ~ 4.4, p = .04 for the
comparison between brand A and the con-
trol condition. The two advertising condi-
tions were not significantly different from
one another. This demonstrates that the
existing leader brand B benefits when they
both advertise because of the information
that the consumer is currently receiving
as well as through the activation/rein-
forcement of prior information from mem-
ory. The new entrant, brand A, will activate
prior knowledge of other brands when
they advertise, until they have developed
a strong enough new-brand schema. Un-
til that point, however, they risk brand or
advertising confusion (where consumers
may associate their advertising with a
better-known brand).
Had we not looked at the memory
change scores but rather at the absolute
ratings, such as the recall and the attitude
measures, then we would have concluded
that brand B's advertising was more in-
fluential. However, because that brand had
saturated the market, seeing one more
advertisement for brand B had little influ-
ence on the internalization process. Con-
sumers already "knew" that brand, and
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the test advertisement was not adding
anything new to that schema. The greater
influence on memory observed for brand
A may be partly due to the fact that
consumers knew little or nothing about
the brand prior to the advertisement view-
ing session. As that brand becomes better
known, it too may reach a saturation point
(as found with the brand B condition),
where the attitude/memory becomes more
stable and less resistant to alteration from
new information.
Relationship between traditionai
advertising measures and memory
reconstruction
As found in psychological and marketing
research, there was little if no relationship
between our explicit measures of adver-
tising effectiveness and our memory
change measure: r = —.07 between atti-
tude toward the advertisement and the
number of memory indicators changed,
and r = .07 between advertising involve-
ment and number of memory indicators
changed. The two explicit advertisement-
rating nieasures were highly correlated:
.63 with one another, however. The indi-
rect measures of influence—memory
change and implicit word completion—
showed only a small positive correlation
(r = .12).
Discussion
Advertising researchers have debated
whether memory or persuasion measures
are the best way to determine advertising
effectiveness. The pendulum is swinging
toward persuasion. An advertisement that
is memorable may be unfocused (Garfield,
1997) or worse, memorable and adversely
impact sales (Jones, 1995). Blair and Rosen-
berg (1994, p. 36) state: "Recall is not a
consistently accurate measure; about half
the time, recall results are predictive of
in-market results, leading to a false reli-
ance on related recall as an advertising
The research reported here suggests that memory and
persuasion ought to be considered together, rather than
as distinct units. The reconstructive nature of recaii is
essential for understanding the persuasive impact adver-
tising has on consumers.
criteria measure." The research reported
here suggests that memory and persua-
sion ought to be considered together, rather
than as distinct units. The reconstructive
nature of recall is essential for understand-
ing the persuasive impact advertising has
on consumers.
Considerable progress has occurred re-
cently in understanding how advertising
influences consumer cognitions. Such
progress, though, has left some research-
ers believing that advertisement testing
may be more difficult than originally
thought: "We may never be able to parse
out the effects of advertising from all the
other marketing factors and marketing
communication forces that affect con-
sumer interactions with and predisposi-
tions for and against individual brands.
There may be no direct line of consumer
questioning that can ever tap into exactly
what happens in a person's mind, either
generally or specifically, with respect to
the perception of brands" (Weilbacher,
2001, p. 20).
We believe that the memory integration
paradigm isolates the impact of advertis-
ing exposure almost immediately after ex-
posure and parses out other influences.
What it reveals, which is a consumer's
own memory change due to exposure, is
a very intimate measure of advertising
impact because it is the consumer's mem-
ory of their own thoughts and feelings
about an issue that is being recalled rather
than their memory of what was presented
by someone or something else. The for-
mer indicates persuasion whereas the lat-
ter may not. Put differently, this approach
focuses on the consumer rather than the
advertisement. Evaluating the impact of
advertising on consumers' memories for
their beliefs and attitudes is thus a truer
indication of advertising's impact or lack
thereof than the self-report measures typ-
ically employed for copy testing. This
measure is "undistorted" by demand char-
acteristics associated with asking people
directly about how niuch they believed
an advertisement. The internalized re-
called belief will have more "staying
power" than a belief/attitude measured
in response to the advertising taken im-
mediately (note here our strong cor-
relation, .64 between beliefs recalled
immediately after an advertising expo-
sure and beliefs reported two to three
days following exposure).
When evaluating an advertisement for
a new brand to be launched in an already
developed product category, knowledge
of other brands is likely to taint how that
new brand is perceived (as indicated in
our study). In relation to other advertise-
ments, that new brand's advertisement
may rate lower due to less familiarity
rather than an objective rating of the ad-
vertisement's message (e.g., the "halo
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effect"). Additionally, as consumers come
to the advertisement-testing session with
already established idiosyncratic atti-
tudes, what is important is how the ad-
vertisement changes an individual's
personal beliefs rather than looking at a
group mean or average that can be swayed
by a few extreme scores. The memory
change measure takes into account past
knowledge and reveals how much (or how
little) impact the test advertisement has
on consumer beliefs.
In other contexts, advertising has been
shown to distort consumers' memories of
past experiences (Braun, 1999) and has
even resulted in the creation of false child-
hood memories of visiting Disneyland and
meeting Bugs Bunny (Braun, Ellis, and
Loftus, 2001). Taken together with the
present findings, this suggests that adver-
tising can have a tremendous impact on
how consumers reconstruct their past
knowledge. Because advertising is most
likely to be noticed after a consumer has
bought the advertised product (Lodish
et al., 1995), advertising as a cause of
memory reconstruction is probably a com-
mon occurrence. This is consonant with
studies of dissonance reduction that sug-
gest that people may use postdecision
information to reinforce the merits of their
decisions, thereby creating after-the-fact a
greater sense of confidence in their initiai
decisions than may have actually been
experienced. Therefore, paradigms such
as the memory integration one offered
here may be very beneficial in the study
of advertising persuasion in the long run.
Because the goal of most advertising is
to produce an enduring emotional impact,
the usage of memory measures is appro-
priate. However, advertising researchers
need to broaden their view of what con-
stitutes memory. According to a recent
advertising text, O'Guinn, Allen, and Se-
menik (1998) state that by far the most
common method of advertising research
continues to be the recall test. But memory
is much more intimate and complex than
what is captured through recall and recog-
nition tests. As one of the authors has noted
elsewhere (Zaltman, 2003, p. 165): "All of
us assume that our memories inherently
belong to us, accurately reflect reality, re-
main under our conscious control, and in-
fluence us only when we 'call them up' or
'bring them to mind.' Yet recent research in
psychology, biology, sociology and neuro-
science reveals that our assumptions about
memory are tenuous at best. Memories are
malleable: not only do they fade or disap-
pear over time, they change every time they
come to mind, with every new human
experience."
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